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INTRODUCTION 
“Simplicity . . . is taken to be a great American virtue.”1 
James Baldwin. 
Simplification of the legal system has attracted attention as a means 
of improving access to  justice. A major  motivation driving reform is  
the perception that pro se litigants have flooded the courts and begun 
clogging up the wheels of justice.2 Ordinary  people do  not know  rules  
of procedure, evidence, or substantive law; do not handle their cases 
effectively or efficiently; and have, the  argument  goes,  generated  a  
“pro se crisis.”3 A number of states and localities have responded by 
increasing the availability of legal services, funding programs that offer 
solutions ranging from limited assistance to full representation, and a 
few legislatures have even established a statutory right to counsel for 
particular categories of cases.4 Given the expense of advocates’ labor, 
however, most jurisdictions have sought instead to improve litigants’ 
 
* Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill. Many thanks to Tonya Brito, Brooke Coleman, Scott Cummings, Russell Engler, 
Rebecca Kunkel, and Lauren Sudeall Lucas for ideas and to Candace Elizabeth Speller 
and Tyler Walters for research assistance. 
1. James Baldwin, Address to the National Press Club Weekly Luncheon: The 
World I Never Made (Dec. 10, 1986), https://www.c-span.org/video/?150875-1/world- 
made (last visited, Mar. 23, 2018). 
2. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se 
Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1274 (2010) (arguing that pro se court reform 
“would alleviate the pro se crisis, make better use of precious judicial resources, save 
money and (as a bonus) produce better, fairer outcomes”) (emphasis added); Richard 
Zorza, Some First Thoughts on Court Simplification, The Key to Civil Access and 
Justice Transformation, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 845, 857–63 (2013) (listing goals of 
simplification). 
3. See, e.g., Barton supra note 2, at 1270–72. 
4. Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 
CONN. L. REV. 741, 760–61 (2015). 
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ability to handle their legal matters on their own.5 As an alternative to 
providing litigants with representatives who could help them navigate 
the courts, a growing number of commentators propose simplifying 
proceedings to obviate the need for such representation.6 Methods of 
simplification include creating form pleadings, introducing technology, 
and relaxing formal rules that could confuse lay litigants.7  Proponents  
of simplification claim that it will decrease the time and cost of 
proceedings,8  help litigants meet the technical requirements of the fora   
in which they appear,9 and increase litigants’ satisfaction with the 
process.10 
This essay argues that the objectives of the simplification project   
are incomplete and carry potential downsides. It does not take the 
position that such efforts should be abandoned but recommends  that 
their limits and unintended consequences receive careful scrutiny. Prior 
commentary has highlighted challenges of simplification from an 
individual litigant’s standpoint, such as the risk of substandard services 
and the reality that one-size-fits-all will not fit everyone.11 This essay 
turns instead to the efficiency goals themselves and how they affect the 
administration of justice broadly defined.12 Part I critiques the goal of 
 
 
5. See Barton, supra note 2, at 1269–71. Cf. Richard Abel, State, Market, 
Philanthropy, and Self-Help as Legal Services Delivery Mechanisms, in PRIVATE 
LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 295, 298 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009) (delineating four 
models for the delivery of services: (1) state; (2) philanthropy; (3) market; and (4) self- 
help). 
6. See Barton, supra note 2, at 1234 (“[B]etter pro se courts would expose  
how unnecessary lawyers are in many cases.”); Zorza, supra note 2, at 860–61 (“A  
major component of cost reduction comes from reducing the need for full advocacy 
services.”). Some commentators also favor simplification of substantive law. Id. at 878; 
BEN BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, ROBOOTING JUSTICE 201–04 (2017). Thoughtful 
scholars and policymakers have also recommended combined approaches that include 
appointment of counsel and elements of simplification. See, e.g., Russell Engler, 
Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal  About  
When Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 38–39 (2010). 
7. See Martha Minow, Foreword to BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA xv, xvii (Samuel Estriecher & Joy Radice eds., 2016) [hereinafter 
BEYOND ELITE LAW]. 
8. See, e.g., Zorza supra note 2, at 856 (system faces “no real pressure for 
simplification, other than occasional, if intensifying, budget crises”). 
9. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra, note 4, at 788. 
10. Zorza, supra note 2, at 858. 
11. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, What We Know and Need to Know About 
Disruptive Innovation, 67 S.C. L. REV. 203, 215–16 (2016). 
12. See also Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777 
(2015) (arguing against civil procedure reform in the name of “efficiency” that cuts 
pecuniary costs while neglecting other categories of costs and  benefits);  Zachary  
Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, at 3 (Aug. 14, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) 
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cutting costs. Part II critiques the goal of increasing speed. Part III  
urges that public interest law values figure more prominently in access 
to justice reform. 
 
I. JUSTICE FOR LESS 
 
Proponents of simplification argue that the access to justice crisis 
makes a complex court system too expensive to administer fairly.13 It is 
simply unrealistic to expect lawyers to be available to represent all 
litigants who need counsel, so we should instead devise solutions less 
expensive than representation.14 If there is a cheaper alternative that 
offers the same substantive outcomes at a fraction of the price, no one 
could object. Indeed, Professor Ben Barton claims that if we develop a 
low-cost alternative that allows people to represent themselves, poor 
litigants could become the envy of the rich; only lawyers and their self- 
interest stand in the way of such a future.15 
Yet the push to make the legal process cheaper rests on two flawed 
assumptions: (1) providing services at lower cost  is  (necessarily) 
socially useful; and (2) decreasing the cost of services increases the 
availability of services (and is the only or best way  to  expand 
availability to reach people with limited financial resources). 
First, making justice cheaper is a socially positive result only if  
there is a net positive in social benefits. As Brooke Coleman  has  
observed in the federal context, commentators considering reforms of   
the civil justice system often collapse the categorical assessments of 
“cheap” and “efficient.”16 They determine  that money-saving reforms  
are efficient without accounting for the full range of benefits and losses 
that result.17 The same mistake appears in analyses of poor people’s 
courts. Many efficiency assessments neglect substantive case outcomes. 
 
 
(explaining that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, measured by willingness to pay, benefits the 
rich over the poor), [https://perma.cc/A73G-2H84]. 
13. BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 6, at 203 (“Complexity is thus at odds with 
equal justice under law.”); Steinberg, supra note 4, at 806–07. 
14. But see RICHARD L. ABEL, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL 
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1, 7 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) [hereinafter 
INFORMAL  JUSTICE]  (“Political  choice  is  portrayed  as blind necessity ............. Informal 
institutions are said to be a necessary response to inexorable  economic  forces.  The 
courts  are  ‘overcrowded,’  there  is  ‘too much’ litigation .............. Yet  even  if  this were 
conceded . . . it would not dictate a response. The courts could be relieved of their 
congestion instantaneously if they expelled all corporate plaintiffs or prohibited the 
government from litigating.”). 
15. Barton, supra note 2, at 1273. 
16. Coleman, supra note 12, at 1777. 
17. Id. at 1777–78. 
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Substantive case outcomes must receive consideration. To the 
extent that simplicity helps litigants manage technical requirements, 
simplification might provide the appearance of improved court access. 
For example, if a court simplifies the process for filing responsive 
pleadings, it might decrease the number of default judgments. Yet 
keeping a pro se defendant’s case alive means little if the substantive 
outcome is unaffected because she does not know how to prove the 
defenses contained in her form answer.18 
Many studies tout pro se court reforms as successful because of 
litigant satisfaction but, even assuming litigant surveys are accurate,19 
subjective indicators should not be the primary measure of success. 
Subjective assessments of court functioning reflect expectations as 
much as results and should not be given undue weight.20 Litigant 
satisfaction does matter from a democratic perspective and one of 
human decency, but ultimately courts make decisions that allocate 
resources and responsibilities. How people feel about the process is 
only part of the story. Legitimacy is a necessary ingredient for a 
healthy legal system but not sufficient. 
Without substantive justice, acceptance of the legal system might  
be more damaging than helpful.21 It remains unclear that pro se court 
reform yields substantive outcomes comparable to those produced by 
legal representation.22 On an individual level, unless accuracy of 
outcomes is protected, the promise of efficiency fails.23 
Even if individual case outcomes were the same, social outcomes 
beyond individual cases must also be considered. Public adjudication 
 
 
 
18. See Steinberg, supra note 4, at 784–85. 
19. See ABEL, supra note 14, at 8 (“[A]although applicants certainly want 
cheap, speedy justice, justice may be more important than speed—and they may be 
willing to pay for it. Finally, there is considerable evidence that people want authority 
rather than informality. They want the leverage of state power to obtain the redress they 
believe is theirs by right, not a compromise that purports to restore a social peace that 
never existed.”). 
20. Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 865, 870 (2005). 
21. See Engler, supra note 6, at 87–88 (“If tenants expect to lose in housing 
court, and landlords expect to win, advice to the tenant that explains the  process but  
fails to affect the outcome might lead to satisfied landlords and tenants.”). 
22. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 6, at 90. 
23. Even for individuals, adjudication produces much more than case 
outcomes. It can create collateral consequences for parties’ physical, emotion, and 
financial health. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the 
Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 111–12; Kathryn A. 
Sabbeth, The Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel and the Discounted Danger 
of Private Power, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 889, 910–15 (2015). 
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serves multiple democratic purposes: development of law,24 
participatory deliberation, public education, deterrence,25 and, 
occasionally, social change.26 The administration of justice is different 
from a commodity or service to be delivered to market as smoothly as 
possible at a cost as close as possible to zero. Reforms of the courts 
concern the design of a justice system, and reducing the costs of the 
system’s administration could result in unintended consequences. 
The imposition of costs can actually produce positive social 
outcomes. To the extent that costs are borne by wrongdoers, costs can 
deter misconduct. This is a basic principle of tort law.27 Social science 
research demonstrates that the possibility of incurring costs serves the 
goal of deterrence. In particular, defendants report that the threat of 
being saddled with victims’ attorneys’ fees makes a difference in their 
calculus about their activity.28 Notably, in this context, where the 
attorney fees result in a deterrent effect, the cost of public interest 
lawyers is not a necessary evil but a socially useful feature of  the  
current system’s design. Were the cost of advocates’ labor reduced, 
certain categories of misconduct might increase. 
Second, another benefit of retaining the costs of the legal system 
might be that the imposition of costs draws attention to otherwise 
neglected social problems. The alleged crisis of pro se litigants 
overwhelming the courts reflects a social reality: in many of these 
cases, people too poor to hire lawyers are getting dragged into court for 
failure to comply with property law.29 Those failures to comply with 
property law, such as to pay rent due, reflect a broader set of political 
and economic circumstances, including the growing gap between wages 
and housing expenses. The attention attracted by costs of the legal 
 
24. See Colleen Shanahan, Anna Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little 
Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1367 (2017) (describing law 
reform activities that may atrophy in the absence of representation). 
25. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding  the  Cause: 
How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for 
Social Change, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 62, 86 (2014). 
26. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth  & David C. Vladeck, Contracting  (Out) Rights,  
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 830–31 (2009) (highlighting benefits of public adjudication 
to be considered when evaluating private dispute resolution mechanisms). 
27. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, An Economic Theory  
of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981). 
28. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 25, at 86 (quoting plaintiffs’ lawyers 
explaining that attorneys’ fees are the “number one . . . deterrent to companies”) 
(citations omitted). 
29. David J. Luban, Self-Representation, Access to Justice, and the Quality of 
Counsel: A Comment on Rabeea Assy’s Injustice in Person: The Right of Self- 
Representation, JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD., *17–19 (forthcoming), 
[https://perma.cc/X3TR-VPQK] (describing other examples of broader changes that  
cause apparent growth in pro se population). 
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system could potentially get directed toward developing solutions to the 
underlying social problems. 
Although this normatively positive impact of costs has not 
previously been studied, examples of it have emerged in criminal law.    
In the criminal context, the costs of the justice system have successfully 
resulted in the decriminalization of conduct.30 Decriminalization has 
included removing categories of conduct from criminal law statutes; 
decreasing penalties for criminal acts still on the books; declining to 
enforce criminal laws as a matter of discretion; and replacing 
punishments, like incarceration, with attempts to address underlying 
causes of the criminal conduct, such as through drug treatment.31 For 
those troubled by mass incarceration and its collateral consequences, 
these efforts might provide a step in the right direction. Regardless of   
the merits of these particular solutions, they suggest that the pressures 
imposed by systemic costs could inspire consideration of policies that 
would otherwise never be attempted. 
In the housing context, if a perception develops that there are too 
many eviction cases and eviction defense is expensive, this might put 
pressure on governments to improve substantive housing laws to 
promote affordable housing. In this sense, the causal arrow could go 
both ways: the rise in homelessness in gentrifying cities has created 
pressure to appoint housing defense lawyers;32 the work of housing 
lawyers and the expense of supplying them could also draw attention 
back to the social phenomena that make housing difficult to maintain. 
Subsidies for civil counsel were never intended to solve a problem 
of legal services’ unaffordability. Rather, they comprised one part of a 
programmatic effort to address broader inequalities. Ideally, providing 
lawyers to the poor was hoped to be a temporary solution, necessary 
only until the underlying inequalities were alleviated. As a historical 
matter, this was the purpose of the Legal Services Corporation: to aid 
the War on Poverty.33 In the current era, the cost of lawyers could 
potentially create incentives for adoption of more fundamental solutions 
to the underlying social problems. 
An obvious counterargument is that our current legal system is far 
from that ideal, and right now the costs of retaining counsel and 
 
30. See Mary Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 
N.C. L. REV. 581, 634–37 (2012); Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police 
Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. REV. 672, 701–02 (2015). 
31. Woods, supra note 30, at 683–84, 686, 689, 693. 
32. Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER, at 30–35 (forthcoming 2018), [https://perma.cc/7XYV-77T5]. 
33. William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal 
Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960’s  to the  1990’s,  17 
ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 241, 244–45 (1998). 
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participating in litigation deter people from enforcing their rights. As an 
obstacle to access, costs thwart the rule of law and the capacity of the 
legal system to protect vulnerable members of society. For example, a 
tenant without the resources to retain counsel might give up her home 
when her landlord threatens eviction even if the case would be non- 
meritorious and a housing defense lawyer could have filed a successful 
motion to dismiss. Even parties able to retain counsel may be stymied 
as the costs of litigation mount. Wealthy parties regularly use discovery 
devices and motion practice to make it impossible for less powerful 
actors to pursue meritorious claims to conclusion. If proceedings were 
simplified and less expensive, access would not be reserved for the 
rich. 
Yet the relationship between financial resources and the ability to 
pursue or defend against litigation stems from the rule that all parties, 
regardless of means, absorb their own litigation costs. Imagine if costs 
could be separated from particular private parties and instead were 
absorbed by another source, another private party, or the state. To 
suggest that decreasing the cost of services increases their availability 
assumes that availability requires the ability to pay. This relies on 
market logic—services will be distributed based on who can pay and 
how much. Yet market logic is not the only way to conceive of the 
distribution of legal (or other goods) and services.34 
For example, fee-shifting statutes support the distribution of legal 
services using a different approach. They deliver services to a defined 
category of victims and assign the costs  to  the  wrongdoers.  
Specifically, they require defendants to cover prevailing plaintiffs’ 
attorney fees in areas of litigation recognized by Congress as in the 
public interest.35 Under fee-shifting provisions, rather than the means of 
the parties, what matters is the subject matter of the litigation and 
whether the plaintiff substantially prevailed. Although fee-shifting 
statutes as a solution to access to justice have their own limitations,36 
 
 
34. See Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 649, 650–53 (2016). 
35. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money Got to Do with It? Public Interest 
Lawyering and Profit, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 465–68 (2014). 
36. For a discussion of how fee-shifting schemes have faltered under attacks 
from the Supreme Court, see Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (ruling that serving as a catalyst for 
change in a defendant’s behavior is not sufficient to obtain payment for lawyers); Evans 
v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 728–30 (1986) (ruling that defendants may condition a 
settlement for full injunctive relief on waiver of all fees for plaintiffs’ counsel); Marek 
v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (holding that a Rule 68 offer  of judgment could cut  
off entitlement to fees), and even when they function, they reward only  particular 
subsets   of   cases.   See   ALAN   K.  CHEN   &  SCOTT   L.  CUMMINGS,  PUBLIC  INTEREST 
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the point is this: the expense of legal representation does not have to be 
borne by the parties to whom our current system assigns it. Costs can   
be separated from the litigants for whom they  are expended.  If  costs  
can be separated from the litigants, making the process cheaper is not 
necessarily relevant to poor litigants’ access to courts. 
 
II. SWIFT JUSTICE 
 
Proponents of simplification argue that it will allow cases to move 
more quickly.37 This will not only make judges’ jobs easier but also will 
improve the experience of litigants. The sluggishness of court processes 
can be particularly burdensome for unrepresented parties. Unlike those 
with counsel to appear on their behalf, pro se parties must attend all 
court dates and wait for their cases to be called. 
Yet we ought not to embrace speed to the point of unraveling  
rights. Russell Engler makes this point well: 
Eviction cases would be greatly simplified if the landlord did 
not have to prove his prima facie case, or tenants were not 
allowed to raise defenses. . . . The question remains as to 
whether speed is a good or bad thing. Where unrepresented 
litigants are steamrolled in housing court, slowing down the 
system is an important goal.38 
To the extent that the assertion of rights requires time (or money) 
and the denial of that opportunity saves resources, there remains a 
question as to whether the savings are worth it. The Supreme Court 
indicated with its Mathews v. Eldridge39 due process test that cutting 
such corners is sometimes a constitutionally acceptable  choice.40  Yet 
even if constitutionally permissible, such choices may not  be  good 
policy. Where do we draw the line? As a society, we recognize that 
efficiency goals should sometimes give way to higher ones.  To  the  
extent that speed is pursued at the expense of compromising rights, 
caution is required. 
One of the best arguments in favor of simplification is that 
complexity allows technicalities to thwart the rule of law and trip up 
 
 
 
LAWYERING:  A  CONTEMPORARY   PERSPECTIVE   188–89  (2013);  Albiston  & Sandefur, 
supra note 23, at 114. 
37. See, e.g., Zorza supra note 2, at 854–55. 
38. Engler, supra note 6, at 76, 87. 
39. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
40. Id. at 348. 
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disadvantaged parties who might otherwise prevail.41 To be sure, this 
does occur with some regularity. Yet “technicalities” that thwart the 
application of law can cut both ways.42 
Slower processes can offer benefits to otherwise disadvantaged 
parties. For a poor tenant facing eviction by a landlord, slowing down 
the process has particular value. It can provide time to scrape together 
money to pay the rent, to accumulate evidence in her defense, or to   
locate alternate housing if ultimately she is forced out of her home. The 
possibility of delay can also convince a landlord to settle on terms that 
account for tenants’ rights and interests.43 
Some of the complexities of housing law were inserted by 
legislatures to protect tenants. It is useful to consider whether 
simplification of housing court processes could  potentially  cause  some 
of these tenant protections to be lost. For example, landlords are 
generally required to serve a notice of termination within a particular 
window of time prior to terminating a tenancy. Without adequate prior 
notice, the tenancy has not been terminated, and an eviction action 
cannot be pursued (unless and until the tenancy is terminated properly). 
If a landlord files an action without proper notice and termination, a 
tenant can file a motion to dismiss, and the action must be dismissed. 
That dismissal would generally be granted without prejudice so the 
landlord could file a new action after proper notice and termination. 
Were the court process streamlined in the interest of speed, this kind of 
“inefficiency” could potentially go by the wayside. 
For poor defendants in civil and criminal proceedings, requiring 
the opposing party to complete a series of steps before a judgment in its 
favor can be enormously beneficial, and often this is the only hope they 
have. Such procedural steps can trip up the plaintiff or prosecutor (as in 
a landlord’s failure to provide notice, resulting in dismissal of an 
action), or offer the defendant a second chance (as in the tenant’s 
opportunity to create a record of good behavior after an initial incident 
of alleged nuisance), with either resulting in an improved outcome for 
the defendant. Even when the outcome remains unchanged, procedural 
hoops can at least hold that final judgment at bay. 
Whether it is by allowing a different substantive result to come 
about or just delaying the inevitable, the process checks the application  
of  the  plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s  otherwise  unbridled power. It might be 
 
41. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculation on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124 (1974) (arguing that complexity 
favors the party with more resources, because they can better manipulate the many 
rules). 
42. See ABEL, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
43. Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only  Justice  is  in  the 
Halls, in INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 119, 131. 
 
 
296 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
said that for parties disadvantaged by the surrounding economic system 
and the underlying substantive law,44 procedural protections are  the 
most that the disadvantaged can expect from the system. 
It is for this reason that historically the critique of lawyers as 
clogging up the courts with overly clever use of technicalities has been 
lodged to undercut public interest lawyering. In the 1980s, federal 
legislators argued that capital defense attorneys were manipulating 
processes rather than promoting fair trials, and then imposed massive 
funding cuts to capital defender offices.45 Just this past year, Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions used similar rhetoric in an attempt to undermine 
lawyers for immigrants, arguing, “[S]mart attorneys have exploited 
loopholes in the law.”46 Yet for capital defendants and  immigrants  
facing removal, it is essential that proper procedures be followed before 
extraordinarily harsh consequences are visited upon them. 
This  is  true  not  only  as  a  matter  of  fairness  to  the  individual 
defendants but also in the interest of restraining excesses of power. The 
function of due process may be understood as erecting obstacles 
between the individual and the force of the state.47 In the words of 
Herbert Packer, “maximal efficiency means maximal tyranny.”48 
Monroe Freedman argued that the purpose of the criminal trial is not 
 
44. Substantive law criminalizes a broad range of behaviors and favors the 
rights of those who own property over those who do not. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Poor 
People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE. L.J. 2176, 2183 (2013) 
(“The criminal law deliberately ignores the social conditions that breed some forms of 
law-breaking. Deviations associated with poverty are not usually ‘defenses’ to criminal 
liability ”). 
45. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Capital Defenders as Outsider Lawyers, 89 CHI. 
KENT L. REV. 569, 591 (2014). 
46. Jeff D. Sessions, Attorney Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (Oct. 12, 2017), [https://perma.cc/UG97-WUWN]. 
47. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 62 (1988) 
(describing the criminal adversarial process and the lawyer’s  role within it as  creating 
an obstacle course for the State); Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the  Criminal  
Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1964) (“[T]he Due Process Model looks very much 
like an obstacle course. Each of its successive stages is designed to present formidable 
impediments to carrying the accused any further along in the process.”). 
48 See Packer, supra note 47, at 16. Packer elaborates: 
Precisely because of its potency in subjecting the individual to the coercive 
power of the state, the criminal process must, on this model, be subjected to 
controls and safeguards that prevent it from operating with maximal 
efficiency. According to this ideology, maximal efficiency means maximal 
tyranny. And, while no one would assert that minimal efficiency means 
minimal tyranny, the proponents of the Due Process Model would accept 
with considerable equanimity a substantial diminution in the efficiency with 
which the criminal process operates in the interest of preventing official 
oppression of the individual. 
Id. 
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(only) to seek truth but to protect individual rights, and that truth- 
seeking functions may be subordinated to those protecting individual 
dignity.49 I would argue that this insight extends beyond the 
requirements of constitutional jurisprudence and individual rights, as it 
reflects a general truth of “political theory and historical experience.”50 
There is democratic value in containing potential abuse by powerful 
parties.51 
Although Freedman focused his writing on criminal defense, the 
need for  restraints on excessive power  exists also in  civil contexts.52  
Just a quick review of poor people’s courts reveals that the state is the 
adversary of the pro se party in a wide variety of civil cases—from  
public housing eviction to termination of parental rights—not only in 
criminal prosecution.53 Just as zealous legal representation and vigilant 
maintenance of the adversary system serve to check state power in 
criminal cases, the need for restraint exists in these civil contexts as 
well.54 
Even when the state is not a party in the technical sense, the state 
plays a role. The state creates, maintains, adjudicates, and enforces all 
law.55 Ultimately, the state’s force is at play in all adjudication.56 The 
state requires the parties to appear or else face the penalty of a default 
judgment and execution of that judgment. The state literally enforces 
those judgments parties refuse or are unable to satisfy. If a losing party 
fails to pay a monetary judgment, a sheriff will  forcibly  seize  her  
assets. If a landlord wins an eviction case, an agent of the state will 
forcibly remove any tenant who remains in possession of the property.57 
The violence of economic force can be as important as violence to the 
 
 
 
 
49. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
2–3 (1975) (suggesting that the purpose of the criminal trial is to protect individual 
rights, not to seek truth); id. at 3–4 (describing human dignity as among the “higher 
values” to which even truth-seeking may be subordinated). See also Packer, supra note 
47, at 17 (describing “guilt-defeating doctrines” of due process model). 
50. See LUBAN, supra note 47, at 60 (“We want to handicap the state in its 
power even legitimately to punish us, for we believe as a matter of political theory and 
historical experience that if the state is not handicapped or restrained ex ante, our 
political and civil liberties are jeopardized.”). 
51. See FREEDMAN, supra note 49, at 2. 
52. See Sabbeth, supra note 23, at 923–24. 
53. Id. at 923. 
54. Id. at 921–23. 
55. Id. at 927 n.261. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
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physical body,58  and, ultimately,  the latter is always available to back   
up the former. 
Like other state actors, judges, too, abuse their power. This results 
not only from implicit and explicit bias related to race, class, and 
gender,59 but also to the desire for speed. While some judges have 
demonstrated a deep and sincere commitment to improving fairness for 
pro se litigants, many others support access to justice measures  
primarily because of the time they hope to shave off proceedings. They 
express hostility towards poor people who consume too much judicial 
attention. For example, judges presiding over criminal cases regularly 
express frustration about the time lost to the assertion of rights by poor 
people’s lawyers.60 Judges in housing courts  have  long  allowed 
landlords to obtain judgments without showing any admissible evidence 
and silenced tenants who have attempted to articulate arguments in their 
own defense.61 It is difficult for an attorney to push back against such 
judicial conduct, but it is all the more challenging for a pro  se  
layperson. Indeed, one of the major reasons for the establishment of 
counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings was the determination that, 
even in a seemingly non-adversarial context, poor people are at a 
disadvantage.62 While it is possible  that an  educational program could 
be undertaken to change judicial attitudes,63 evidence from the 
development of the right to criminal defense counsel indicates that it is 
establishment of a clear right to counsel that may be most effective in 
changing court culture.64 In the absence of restraints on their power, 
 
 
58. See Sarah Buhler, “Don’t Want to Get Exposed”: Law’s Violence and 
Access to Justice, 26 J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 68, 74–75 (2017) (summarizing critical  
literature on the “violence of social and economic inequality”). See also Sabbeth, supra 
note 23, at 910 (discussing definitions of liberty that privilege freedom  from 
incarceration over other forms). 
59. See Sabbeth, supra note 32 (collecting literature). 
60. See, e.g., Nicole Martorano Van Cleve, Reinterpreting the Zealous 
Advocate: Multiple Intermediate Roles of the Criminal Defense Attorney, in LAWYERS IN 
PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN  CONTEXT  293, 299, 309–12 (Leslie C. Levin  
& Lynn Mather eds., 2012). 
61. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and 
Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 
(1992). 
62. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
63. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise, 
Understanding Relational and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM. 
SOC. REV. 909, 910 (2015) (explaining that lawyers’ “presence in a courtroom 
encourages the court to follow its own rules”). 
64. See Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15,  18–23 
(2016) (describing how judges pre-Gideon showed little regard for the  right  to  
appointed counsel, even when mandated by state law, but attitudes shifted after the 
decision). 
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even well-intended judges might simplify proceedings to the point of 
sacrificing litigants’ substantive and procedural rights.65 
In addition to the need to spend time to protect litigants’ rights, 
investments of time can offer inherent benefits. Like the financial costs 
discussed in the previous section, time costs can result in socially 
beneficial consequences, such as increased public education and 
deterrence. For example, litigation that attracts attention can educate  
the public and impact the reputations of alleged  bad  actors.66  When 
more time passes before the parties reach a resolution, potentially more 
education and deterrence can result from the litigation process. 
Reputational harms—such as to employee morale, customer  loyalty,  
and investor interest—can translate into financial impact exceeding that 
of a monetary judgment.67 Even before or without any monetary 
judgment, information unearthed during discovery, along with any 
media coverage, can magnify reputational harms. The longer litigation 
continues, the more potential there is for reputational damage from 
discovery produced and disseminated, and the longer media actors will 
continue to remind the public of the underlying misconduct alleged. 
While most of the literature on this topic comes from federal litigation, 
the logic could potentially apply in other public interest cases, 
particularly if poor parties work in concert with organizers who bring 
broader attention to the underlying conduct. Delay can increase the 
capacity of litigation to educate the public and influence the reputations 
of alleged bad actors. Slowness of adjudication is not necessarily a bad 
thing. 
It must be acknowledged that slowing the machinery of justice  is 
not only a potential byproduct of respecting poor people’s rights, such   
as that of the tenant to raise defenses in Engler’s example, but such 
slowing is often an intentional strategy on behalf of the disadvantaged 
precisely because it can benefit them. Advocates of a right to counsel in 
civil matters tend to assert that counsel will smooth out and speed up 
proceedings currently slowed down by pro se litigants’ confusion. Yet 
the presence of lawyers can also have the reverse effect; indeed, delay 
 
 
65. See Zorza, supra note 2, at 857 (arguing for decreasing requirements for 
written opinions articulating bases for judicial decisions); cf. Steinberg, supra note 4, at 
787–88 n.256 (advocating for simplification measures but highlighting the need  for 
limits on judicial discretion). 
66. See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 
493–509 (2004) (describing history of litigation attracting public attention); Roy 
Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation, How the Legal System Shapes Behavior by 
Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1200–01 (2016). 
67. See Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE  L.J.  
(forthcoming 2018), [https://perma.cc/MEE8-5PVM]. 
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by lawyers is often intentional.68 The ethics of intentional delay are 
beyond the scope of this essay, but the point is that speed  is  not  a 
neutral or inherently positive value: the meanings assigned to speed and 
delay depend on the political, economic, and  legal  environment. 
Whether speed is an unvarnished good depends on the context and goals 
of adjudication. Sometimes checks on power require time to administer, 
and sometimes delay is itself an important check. 
 
III. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 
 
Although the drive to simplify poor people’s courts reflects  efforts  
to make justice attainable for a larger percentage of the population, it 
should not go unnoticed that a similar trend has been underway across 
U.S. civil and criminal justice systems. In recent decades, a “cost-and- 
delay narrative” has driven reforms of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, even in the face of contradictory empirical evidence.69 The 
populist70 push to simplify courts and make them accessible without the 
need for lawyers71 reflects a broader anti-lawyer sentiment and anti- 
regulation trend, which favor privatizing adjudication and eschewing 
formal law for informal arrangements.72 
The shift from formal law to informal arrangements includes a 
dramatic reduction in trials. Increasingly, civil litigation ends in 
settlements73 and criminal defendants accept pleas.74 Litigants resolve 
their cases through negotiation rather than adjudication.75 Individual 
choice of contract, rather than the mandatory application of rules, 
 
 
68. See BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 6, at 108. 
69. See Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice 
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2012). 
70. See, e.g., Editors’ Preface to BEYOND ELITE LAW, supra note 7, at xi 
(arguing that the U.S. legal system “remains, at its core, a system of elite law largely 
for the elite” and “system redesign is needed to help people better represent 
themselves”). 
71. See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying sources. 
72. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: 
Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates,  and  
Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017). 
73. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials 
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 
461–84 (2004); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073–75 
(1984); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 
2619 (1995). 
74. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1089, 1093–94 (2013). 
75. Query how voluntary these arrangements are and what alternatives, if any, 
exist. 
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governs.76 Both the process and the results remain outside the public 
eye.77 
Much dispute resolution has migrated out of the courthouse 
altogether. In many jurisdictions, mediation is mandatory as a 
prerequisite to adjudication. Quotidian activities, such as purchasing a 
cell phone or accepting a job at a chain restaurant,78 require giving up  
the right to judicial adjudication and replacing it with arbitration. The 
replacement fora are favored for reaching results that are not required    
or restrained by the parties’ legal relationships. Unlike the rough justice 
of law, the argument goes, parties can craft solutions that are tailored to 
what they are able and willing to offer. Access to justice has been 
marshaled as an argument in favor of alternative dispute resolution. The 
“simpler” fora are touted as more easily navigated by ordinary 
individuals, including those without counsel.79 I’ve argued  elsewhere 
that the reality is less encouraging, both for individuals and for society  
as a whole.80 
Some of the democratic purposes of public courts could appear to 
have more relevance for civil rights cases in federal courts than eviction 
cases in small claims court. Yet the need for public airing of disputes 
may be equally if not more important in poor people’s courts. The 
simplification trend in access to justice discussions reveals a growing 
chasm between access to justice for poor people and public interest law. 
The simplification approach assumes legal services lawyers will not be 
doing any public interest law of the law-changing or law-challenging 
kind.81 
The drive to simplify proceedings and distill them to a one-size- 
fits-all approach suggests poverty law is static, or at least that it is 
incapable of revision on behalf of the less powerful through litigation. 
It treats law as a cumbersome tool to be managed. This neglects the 
ways creative lawyering can revise case law over time so that the 
substance becomes better (or at least less bad) for the poor. 
 
76. See Resnick, supra note 72, at 1921 (citing her own earlier work); Josh 
Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133 (2013); Jenny Roberts, 
Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 (2013). 
77. See Resnick, supra note 72, at 1920–21. 
78. See id. at 1926–30 (discussing EEOC v. Waffle House and reprinting 
arbitration “contract” at issue in that case). 
79. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate 
Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
559, 563 (2001). 
80. Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 26. 
81. See Shanahan et al., supra note 24, at 1367 (“From the perspective of 
solving the civil access to justice crisis, it seems like a concession to the larger crisis to 
give some individuals representation—when they would otherwise have none—yet be 
satisfied when this representation excludes them from the evolution of the law.”). 
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Simplification, with its de-emphasis on law and reliance on 
unrepresented parties to serve themselves, leaves little room for public 
interest law as an agent of change. 
Some might argue that simplification devices will free  up  more 
time for legal services lawyers to handle public interest law cases, but it 
remains unclear how lawyers will find those matters.  Who will make  
the assessment of complexity and at what stage? To  the extent a  line 
can be drawn between public interest and ordinary matters (which is 
questionable),82 that distinction is not always apparent at the outset of 
representation. Finding a complicated issue or the potential to influence 
precedent can happen along the way; a lawyer conducting an evaluation 
might not know what a case  involves before finding herself  knee-deep   
in a knotty problem that at first appeared simple. 
Many nooks and crannies of poverty law have not been litigated 
precisely because of the underavailability of lawyers representing the  
side of the poor. The Court in Turner v. Rogers83   decided that there is   
no right to appointment of counsel in a civil contempt  proceeding  in 
part because it assumed the question of the ability to pay child support   
is a simple one,84 but perhaps the issue is not simple; it is just 
underlitigated.85 If we find cases simple because lawyers have not  
handled them frequently enough to develop a  complex  body  of  case  
law, and then we deem those cases unworthy of appointment of counsel 
because of the lack of complexity, the underdevelopment of  law  on  
behalf of the poor recreates itself in an unfortunate feedback loop. 
Obviating the need for lawyers is tempting as a democratic project, 
given the skepticism the legal profession has earned by its own conduct 
and the important observations of critical scholars highlighting the 
power dynamics at play in the lawyer-client relationship.86 Yet 
democratic values like dignity and voice are not necessarily satisfied by 
the opportunity to fill out forms. Court access must mean more.87 
 
82. See generally Rebecca Sharpless, More Than One Lane Wide: Against 
Hierarchies of Helping in Progressive Legal Advocacy, 19 CLINICAL L. REV.  347  
(2012). 
83. 564 U.S. 431 (2011). 
84. Id. at 438. 
85. See Laura K. Abel, Turner v. Rogers and the Right  of Meaningful Access  
to the Courts, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 805, 816–18 (2012) (questioning the Court’s 
assumptions about the lack of complexity and highlighting contrary evidence in the 
record). 
86. See Dana Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism 21–23 (Apr. 30, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), [https://perma.cc/GT3X-HWLH]. 
87. Luban, supra note 29, at *22 (“[T]hose who defend the right of self- 
representation on autonomy grounds usually offer merely ‘an abstract idea of freedom 
of choice,’ without explaining why freedom to personally handle the minutiae of a civil 
trial is a choice that matters. . . . [W]hat does matter is having one’s voice and 
 
 
2018:287 Simplicity as Justice 303 
 
Relatedly, while it is important to examine the power dynamics 
between lawyers and clients, it remains as important as ever to maintain 
the strength of lawyers who can protect clients from third parties who 
wield far more dangerous power.88 
Advocates of simplicity are right that access to justice should mean 
more than access to lawyers.89 But they are wrong if they suggest the 
latter is entirely extraneous to the pursuit of the former. Barton says 
people need housing, not housing lawyers.90 It is undeniable that  
housing is a first order need while legal representation is not. But 
sometimes representation helps people meet their more basic needs. 
Sometimes lawyers force actors with material resources  to  transfer  
those resources, which can make an enormous  difference  to  the 
recipient, and sometimes lawyers can push substantive law in a better 
direction for the future. To deny these aspects of lawyers’ work is to 
imply a profound loss of faith in the professional project and the  
potential of public interest law.91 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The promise of faster, cheaper justice is  tempting,  and  if  
individual litigants seem satisfied with simpler procedures, it sounds 
anti-democratic to object.  Yet  customer  service  and  economic 
efficiency are not, and should not become, the core values of justice. 
Financial costs will always influence the details of policy, but the 
distribution and consequences of costs reflect economic and political 
choices. These are not absolute laws of the universe but  instead  
variables subject to creative adjustment. In designing a system of  
justice, considerations of cost should be secondary to our core values.  
The time required for legal proceedings also, while a relevant variable, 
should not accumulate outsized weight. There are some rights too 
fundamental   to   sacrifice   for   speed.   Moreover,   while   it   may   be 
 
 
viewpoint reflected . . .”) (quoting RABEEA ASSY, INJUSTICE IN PERSON: THE RIGHT TO 
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88. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ 
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controversial to delay matters intentionally, slowness can in some cases 
serve as a desperately needed restraint on the application of force. 
The purpose of this essay is not to argue against all simplification 
measures. Scholars like Jessica Steinberg and Russell Engler  have  
offered thoughtful approaches to designing a hybrid  of  simplification 
and an increase in appointment of counsel.92 Certainly, common-sense 
reforms could make poor people’s courts less like Kafka’s  Trial.93  
Creation of form pleadings would be beneficial in  non-contested 
matters94 and potentially some contested matters.95 For example,  in  
many jurisdictions, courts already provide complaint forms for  
landlords initiating eviction proceedings to check the boxes indicating  
the bases for the actions. To provide form pleadings for landlords, the 
disproportionately represented parties, and not tenants, the 
disproportionately unrepresented parties, is backwards, and correction   
of that asymmetry could be productive. Other simplification devices, 
using technology for document assembly, could also have a normatively 
positive impact. 
Yet the question remains whether such measures might not go far 
enough or, more to the point, might go too far in the wrong direction.  
We should not confuse the benefits that flow from the availability of   
form answers with the benefits that flow from the availability of zealous 
advocates.96 As we experiment with simplification in the name of access 
to justice, it is incumbent upon us to keep in mind what we mean by 
justice. Promotion of public law values, namely  democratic  
participation and limiting excesses of power, must remain among our 
highest priorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92. See Engler, supra note 6 (offering comparative assessments of pro se 
reform and appointment of counsel across different areas); Steinberg supra note 4, at 
747 (proposing reforms including mandatory form pleadings for both sides, revision of 
evidentiary rules, and guidelines to limit judicial discretion). 
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94. See Steinberg, supra note 4, at 786 (describing absurdly complex process 
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